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ABSTRACT
Some industrial systems are dicult to formally verify due to their
large scale. In particular, the widespread use of lookup tables in
embedded systems across diverse industries, such as aeronautics
and automotive systems, create a critical obstacle to the scalabil-
ity of formal verication. is paper presents Osiris, a tool that
automatically computes abstractions of lookup tables. Osiris uses
these abstractions to verify a property in rst order logic. If the
verication fails, Osiris uses a falsication heuristic to search for a
violation of the specication. We validate our technique on a public
benchmark of an adaptive cruise controller with lookup tables.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Cyberphysical systems are growing in scale and complexity, and are
being deployed for a variety of applications. Some of these applica-
tions are safety-critical, such as aeronautics and driver-assistance
features, and others require high performance and quality of service,
such as network systems. ese applications require the highest
level of assurance. Existing formal verication techniques, however,
are dicult to scale to many of these applications. For example, a
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component in a production system that we have considered con-
tains over 1050 total proof cases, which would require an estimated
1034 years on a machine with one million cores, assuming 0.01
seconds per proof case.
Based on our experience with industrial systems, we have ob-
served that the widespread use of lookup tables creates a critical
obstacle to scalability of formal methods. Lookup tables are an
important and irreplaceable element of modern engineering design.
Some lookup tables are used to model severely nonlinear physical
components—for which no satisfactory equational model exists.
Others serve as control laws in cases where no traditional control
design method delivers the required performance. Others still serve
as arithmetic shortcuts to quickly compute complex functions, such
as trigonometrics, in embedded systems with timing constraints.
Lookup-tables challenge traditional verication techniques be-
cause each entry of the lookup table must be treated as a separate
case. If the system under analysis contains a large number of cas-
caded lookup tables, the number of proof cases grows exponentially,
quickly outstripping the ability of a supercomputer to deliver timely
verication results as part of a product-development cycle.
We have developed a tool, Osiris, which reconstructs an approx-
imation of the function implemented by the lookup table, and uses
this approximation to construct upper and lower bounding func-
tions on the lookup table data. Osiris uses an SMT solver as a
back-end to verify that the lookup table data is correctly abstracted,
and then uses the abstractions to prove the desired property.
If the proof aempt fails, Osiris extracts a candidate counterexam-
ple or a specic case in which the abstractions hold but the desired
specication is violated. is candidate counterexample can be
used to evaluate situations in which the system may nearly violate
its specication, and can be used to search for a true counterex-
ample. If a true counterexample cannot be found, Osiris renes
its abstractions by increasing the degree of the abstractions, i.e.
moving from linear to quadratic, and then to cubic.
We illustrate the performance of our approach on a cruise con-
trol benchmark published by Toyota InfoTechnology Center. is
benchmark consists of a controller with a monitor that tries to
detect dangerous conditions [16]. is benchmark contains three
lookup tables. e simplest lookup table is one-dimensional and the
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most complex lookup table is three-dimensional. e total number
of combinations of lookup table outputs is 77,409,024.
e paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes related
work, Section 3 provides background on lookup tables and SMT
verication approaches, and Section 4 explains our problem state-
ment. We defer a detailed treatment of Osiris’ abstraction compu-
tation technique to a future publication, but Section 5 describes a
high-level view of this procedure, as well as how we use them for
verication and falsication, and how we rene them if the speci-
cation cannot be proved nor falsied. Section 6 describes Osiris,
Section 7 presents our case study, and Sections 8 and 9 conclude
and describe directions for future work.
2 RELATEDWORK
To the best of our knowledge, research interest in formal veri-
cation of lookup tables is recent. e authors of [13] opine that
abstractions should be valuable for analysis of large models with
lookup tables, but do not develop a concrete abstraction scheme.
Our present work develops a tool to automatically compute abstrac-
tions via a counterexample-guided abstraction renement method,
a common paradigm to iteratively generate and improve abstrac-
tions [4]
e work of [12] uses a user-assisted mechanical theorem prover
to prove safety of a large-scale aircra collision avoidance system,
which includes a large lookup table. e work of [12], however,
relies on a human user to provide insight and manually reduce the
system to simpler forms, until it is possible to derive input-output
conditions on the lookup table to guarantee safety. is technique
works top-down, starting from an overall system specication and
decomposed with user assistance to a specication on the lookup
table itself. is technique would be dicult to apply in a scenario
with multiple cascaded lookup tables, since it would be dicult to
decompose the high-level specication into obligations for each
table, which would require the computationally infeasible task of
propagating logical formulas through the tables. In contrast, our
technique works boom-up, treating the lookup table as training
data for an automatic learning procedure, which learns an abstrac-
tion of the lookup table. is abstraction is then used as part of an
SMT query to check that the system specication is satised.
e work of [11] uses a technique to eliminate proof cases that
are not reachable, and then analyzing the remaining cases in paral-
lel with the theorem prover PVS. [11] run their technique on the
same public benchmark as we do, and reduce the approximately
seven million proof cases to approximately seventy thousand for
a runtime of approximately four hours. In contrast, our tool uses
an SMT backend instead of a theorem prover. e choice of an
SMT tool choice aords greater automation and greater speed. Our
abstraction-based tool can handle this benchmark in 30 seconds on
a machine with the same specications (44 cores, 256 GB RAM).
Further, we believe that our abstraction technique can beer scale
to larger models, since our abstractions decompose the system and
prevent the case explosion to begin with, instead of ltering a large
set of cases. is greater speed, however, comes at a price: if the
proof fails, there is no partial proof that a designer can analyze. To
address this issue, Osiris also implements a falsication heuristic
to automatically search for error traces.
3 BACKGROUND
3.1 Lookup Tables
Informally, a lookup table is a function dened by a table of input
and output values. A lookup table maps certain points of its input
space, called breakpoints, to values prescribed by a given table,
such as the one shown in Table 1. Note that despite the tabular
structure, Table 1 represents an n-dimensional lookup table, not a
two-dimensional one. e output of the function for values that do
not appear in the table are computed by some given interpolation
function if they are contained in the range of the breakpoints, and
by some extrapolation function otherwise.
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Table 1: Lookup Table with n inputs andm breakpoints
Formally, an n-dimensional lookup table withm-breakpoints is
a function λ : Rn → R, such that
(1) for each breakpoint (x (k ) ,y (k ) ) (k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}) that ap-
pears in the table, λ(x (k ) ) = y (k ) , and
(2) for every point x ∈ Rn that does not appear in the table,
(a) if each component xi is contained in the range of
the lookup table, i.e. mink (x
(k )
i ) ≤ xi ≤ maxk (x (k )i )
for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, then λ(x ) is given by some
interpolation function interp.
(b) otherwise, λ(x ) is given by some extrapolation scheme
extrap.
Our approach is general, and can be applied to any interpolation
and extrapolation functions. However, in our case study, we will
interpolate the lookup table by the multilinear interpolation formula
described in [3]. For n dimensions, we will use the notation
multiLinInterpn ((x
(1) ,y (1) ), (x (2) ,y (2) ),x )
to mean the n-dimensional interpolation function between points
(x (1) ,y (1) ) and (x (2) ,y (2) ), evaluated at x . For simplicity, we will
not extrapolate the lookup tables in our case study and simply
assume that the range of interest is restricted to the range of the
lookup tables.
3.2 Lookup tables as logical formulas
Our technique relies on the ability to encode the system and its
specication into rst-order logic. An n-dimensional,m-breakpoint
lookup table can be encoded as a rst-order logical formula as
follows.
Consider, without loss of generality, a two-dimensional lookup
table withm breakpoints. e k-th breakpoint can be encoded by
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the following logical formula when k = 1, . . . ,m − 1.
bk ≡x (k )1 ≤ x1 ≤ x (k+1)1 ∧ x (k )2 ≤ x2 ≤ x (k+1)2 →
y = multiLinInterp2 ((x
(k ) ,y (k ) ), (x (k+1) ,y (k+1) ),x )
e vector x is the input of the lookup table, and x1 and x2 are its
components. e function multiLinInterp2 is bilinear interpola-
tion. Similar expressions can be derived for lookup tables of other
dimensions.
e overall lookup table can be expressed by the conjunction of
the logical formulas for the breakpoints.
L ≡
m∧
k=1
bk (1)
3.3 Satisability Modulo eories
Let Γ(x ) be a set of logical formulas with a vector of free variables
x , and suppose x takes values in Rn . e problem of satisability
modulo theory of the reals is to nd a point r ∈ Rn such that the
logical formula Γ(r ) is true, or prove that none exists. In this case
we say that r satises Γ.
Solvers exist that can solve the problem of satisability modulo
theory of the reals for subsets of rst-order logic, such as logical
constraints that contain only polynomial functions over the reals [5].
e general problem is referred to as satisability modulo theories
(SMT), since these solvers frequently support logical formulas over
other sets, such as naturals or oating point numbers. Other solvers
support transcendental functions, but relax the problem to nding
an approximate solution or proving that not even an approximate
solution exists [8].
4 PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this paper, we consider the problem of proving input-output
properties of controllers. For future work, we plan to extend our
technique closed-loop properties of a control system, by applying
our abstraction technique to the lookup tables, and then using a
specialized solver to reason about the continuous portion of the
dynamics. For example, bounded-time properties could be handled
by a tool such as [6, 7, 9]. Unbounded-time properties would need
to be supplemented by an automated invariant-guessing heuristic,
such as [14].
Our approach can be applied to controller models that are given
in rst-order logic. In industry, controllers are frequently modeled
either as imperative programs (for example in C), or as signal-ow
models, e.g. Simulink.
In the case of imperative languages, Dynamic Logic provides
a generic framework for translating common imperative control
structures into rst-order logic [10].
Numerous semantics have been proposed for signal-ow lan-
guages such as Simulink [2, 15] and Lustre. For our purposes, it
suces that the selected semantics should result in rst-order logi-
cal constraints. We assume one of these existing semantic interpre-
tations has already been used to translate the model appropriately,
and in our case study we perform the translation manually.
Regardless of the original format of the controller, we assume
that it has been translated to a set of logical constraints Σ(x ), not
including any lookup tables, where x is the vector of all variables
that occur in the system, including inputs, outputs, and intermediate
assignment variables. We handle the lookup tables separately, and
assume that each lookup table, indexed by i has been encoded as the
rst-order logic formula Li (x ) as described in Section 3. Similarly,
we assume that the specication is given as a rst-order formula
S (x ).
en, the problem is to determine whether there exists a value
of the variables x that
(1) satises the model constraints Σ(x ), i.e., the values are re-
lated to each other according to the structure of the model;
(2) satises each Li , i.e., the values are related to each other in
a way that satises the mapping produced by the lookup
tables; and
(3) does not satisfy the specication S (x ), i.e., it is an erroneous
condition.
To check for the existence of this kind of erroneous condition,
we can use an SMT solver to check the satisability of the following
logical formula, assuming the number of lookup tables in the model
is N . *.,
N∧
i=1
Li (x )
+/- ∧ Σ(x ) ∧ ¬S (x )
is logical formula states that values for the vector of variables
x must satisfy each lookup table Li as well as the model constraints
Σ(x ). In addition, the value x should falsify the safety condition
S (x ). If no such value exists, then the system is guaranteed to be
defect-free.
e key obstacle to directly checking this condition is that the
lookup table formulas Li are large, and this large scale is dicult.
Further compounding this problem, each entry of the lookup table
is encoded as an implication, which induces a case analysis: each
range on the le-hand side of the implication is a case, and the
right-hand side of the implication is the value of the table at that
case. If we assume for simplicity that all lookup tables have m
cases, and that there are k lookup tables in a model, hence the total
number of cases ismk . is exponential explosion in cases forbids
a naive analysis.
Our approach is to generate an abstraction Ai for each Li by
using the lookup table data as training data to learn parameters
in an abstraction template. As a result, the logical formula will
be simplied, but the abstraction loses information. To address
this, we provide a falsication heuristic that can help to nd true
counterexamples when the verication does not succeed.
5 COMPUTING ABSTRACTIONS
We will defer a thorough treatment of our abstraction computation
technique for a future publication, so we will only give a high-
level overview here. Our approach to improve scalability is to
abstract the lookup tables by functional intervals. A functional
interval is a function that for each argument x ∈ Rn returns a
(closed) interval over R, A(x ) = [a(x ),b (x )] where a(x ) is the lower
bounding envelope around the lookup table and b (x ) is the upper
bounding envelope. We say that a functional intervalA(x ) abstracts
a lookup table L(x ) over a set S ⊆ Rn if for every x ∈ S , L(x ) ∈ A(x ).
A functional interval abstraction is an overapproximation of a
lookup table, in the sense that a property that holds for all values
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in the interval A(x ) must also hold of L(x ), but not vice-versa.
e abstraction loses precision, but provides a simplication if the
functions a(x ) and b (x ) have a suciently simple structure.
As a result, a procedure to compute a functional interval abstrac-
tion must balance between two conicting requirements. On the
one hand, it should be as precise as possible, by keeping the size
of the interval small for every x , but it must also have a simple
arithmetic structure, preferably consisting of linear or low-order
polynomial terms, so that proving that the desired property holds
of the abstraction is as simple as possible.
To navigate these conicting requirements, we rst try to ab-
stract the lookup tables with linear abstractions, and see if these
simple abstractions are sucient to prove the specication or to
guide the search to a counterexample. If the simple, linear abstrac-
tions are insucient, then we iteratively increase the complexity to
a quadratic template, then to cubic, etc. As we describe in Section
6, our tool uses a library of abstraction templates that are indexed
by complexity, and iterates through them on each subsequent ab-
straction aempt.
In the following, we will describe our procedure for computing
abstractions from approximations, and how these same abstractions
can guide the search for a counterexample when the specication
cannot be proved in the rst aempt.
5.1 Computing abstractions by approximation
We use a regression-based procedure to automatically compute a
functional interval for each lookup table in the model. First, we x
a parametric template for a function that approximates the lookup
table data, and then we will proceed to learn parameter values that
allow the function to approximate the lookup table data. Next, we
use bisection search to search for the smallest oset that can be
added and subtracted from the approximation to yield upper and
lower bounds for the lookup table function.
We begin by computing an approximation of the lookup table
data. Formally, let f (a,x ) be a function parametrized by a ∈ Rp ,
with the same domain and range as the lookup table function L. We
solve a regression problem to nd the value of the parameter vector
a that minimizes the mean-squared error over the breakpoints of
the lookup table.
minimize
a
k∑
i=1
(y (k ) − f (a,x (k ) ))2
Let a∗ be the value of a found by this optimization problem. Next,
we use the approximation f (a∗,x ) to nd a functional interval. We
begin by seing the oset to some initial value, eg. ϵ = 1. en,
we use an SMT solver to check whether the lower and upper oset
functions f (a∗,x ) − ϵ and f (a∗,x ) + ϵ are lower and upper bounds
for the lookup table function over all values in the range of interest
S ⊆ Rn . is is equivalent to checking the validity of the following
logical formula with an SMT solver.
∀x ∈ R . f (a∗,x ) − ϵ ≤ L(x ) ∧ L(x ) ≤ f (a∗,x ) + ϵ
Note that the expression for L(x ) contains the values of the break-
points as well as the multilinear interpolation expressions in be-
tween the breakpoints of L.
Figure 1: Lookup table function L(x ) abstracted by upper and
lower bounding functions, obtained by shiing an approxi-
mation f (a∗,x ).
If the validity check fails, i.e. the SMT solver is able to nd an
x ∈ S such that the lookup table produces a value outside of the
upper and lower bounds, we try again with a larger value of ϵ . If it
succeeds, with this value as the upper cap (valid ϵ) and 0 (invalid ϵ)
as the lower cap we do a bisection search to nd the smallest value
of ϵ (within some tolerance) such that the oset functions abstract
the lookup table. is yields a functional interval,
A(x ) = [f (a∗,x ) − ϵ , f (a∗,x ) + ϵ]
such that for all x ∈ S , L(x ) ∈ A(x ). is relationship is illustrated
in Figure 1
5.2 Falsication
If the verication aempt does not succeed, it means that a value
x = xˆ was found such that the abstractions were satised, but the
specication was falsied. is candidate counterexample is not
necessarily a true counterexample, since a point that satises the
abstractions may not satisfy the lookup tables.
However, this candidate counterexample serves as a ag of a
region that may contain a true counterexample. It is sensible to
search between the breakpoints that contain this counterexample,
but note that this point may fall between dierent breakpoints in
dierent lookup tables, which could potentially lead us to choose
intervals from dierent lookup tables that are inconsistent with
each other. To prevent this, instead of simply selecting the two
breakpoints that contain the candidate counterexample, we select
a small number r of the nearest breakpoints. See Figure 2 for an
illustration of this mechanic. In our experiments, r = 3 or r = 4 are
usually large enough to prevent inconsistent intervals.
Informally, we construct new lookup tables with only r entries
each, and aempt to verify the same model with the reduced lookup
tables, this time directly, without abstractions. If the verication
succeeds, we know the candidate counterexample was spurious, and
can repeat the procedure with a dierent candidate counterexample.
If the verication fails, it provides a true counterexample which
can be returned to the engineer as a design aw that must be xed.
Formally, let x j , . . . ,x j+n be the n inputs of lookup table Li .
en, consider the values of these variables in the candidate coun-
terexample xˆ j , . . . , xˆ j+n . We wish to extract the r nearest entries
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along each dimension—suppose they are x (k )j , . . . ,x
(k+r )
j through
x
(k )
j+n , . . . ,x
(k+r )
j+n . en, construct a new lookup table Lˆi that con-
tains only these breakpoints, and maps them to the same outputs
as Li . Finally, check satisability of the following logical formula.
*,
∧
i
Lˆi+- ∧ Σ(x ) ∧ ¬S (x ) (2)
If a satisfying instance is found, then that instance is a true coun-
terexample of the original model. If no satisfying instance is found,
then we can try the procedure with a dierent candidate coun-
terexample that is at some minimum distance δ from xˆ . To do this
xˆ j , . . . , xˆ j+n
If there are no more candidate counterexamples at this mini-
mum distance, we move on to the next step, which is to rene the
abstractions and aempt verication again.
Figure 2: e red X represents a candidate counterexample.
To search for a true counterexample, we construct a reduced
table consisting of the four nearest breakpoints, which com-
prise the three intervals marked by the dotted rectangle
5.3 Abstraction renement
When the SMT solver nds candidate counterexamples, meaning it
is unable to prove correctness, and the falsication procedure fails
to nd a true counterexample, we rene the abstractions and repeat
the verication aempt. ere are two basic mechanisms by which
we rene abstractions: (1) increasing arithmetic complexity of the
templates, and (2) increasing the number of cases in a piecewise
template.
Our tool implementation tries both of these techniques at the
same time, and keeps the technique that yields the approximation
with lowest error.
Increasing arithmetic complexity means moving from linear
templates to quadratic templates, higher-order polynomials, or
possibly transcendental functions if one is using an SMT solver that
supports such functions, such as [8]. Increasing the number of cases
in a piecewise template means moving from a simple equational
template to a template with two cases, or from two to three, etc.
Figure 3: High-level view of Osiris
6 TOOL IMPLEMENTATION
We have implemented our technique in a tool called “Osiris”. Figure
3 shows the overall control ow of the tool.
6.1 Input
e input to Osiris is a directory which contains
(1) a le with extension *.fmlas, which lists the bounds on
the inputs of the model, as well as calculations by system
elements that are not lookup tables, and
(2) for each lookup table, a *.m le, which contains a lookup
table in standard Matlab syntax.
6.2 Learning abstractions with an extensible
template library
Osiris reads the templates for the approximating functions from
an external library, which can be modied and extended by the
user. e templates are sorted by complexity, starting by linear
templates, then quadratic templates, etc.
Osiris automatically starts working with a batch of the lowest
complexity templates and computes approximations from them
in parallel. All approximations are turned into abstractions by
computing the smallest ϵ oset that produces upper and lower
bounding function to the lookup table function. Checking the
upper and lower bound properties is carried out with z3.
Since the learning procedure is not, for general templates, con-
vex and therefore not guaranteed to converge to the same solution
from dierent initial parameter values, it is advantageous to have
multiple copies of the same template at the same complexity index
in the library. In this way, Osiris solves multiple instances in paral-
lel with dierent initial parameter values. e nal selection for
lowest ϵ ensures that we will be able to keep the best abstraction.
Figure 4 shows this ow, where bold lines indicate multiple parallel
instances.
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Figure 4: Flow of the abstraction generation procedure. Bold
lines indicate multiple parallel instances.
Our library also has a section for domain-specic templates. We
envision that future users of our tool will be interested in augment-
ing the library with templates from engine control, uid dynam-
ics, and other applications. ese domain-specic templates allow
computing abstractions that beer match the mathematics of the
application domain.
6.3 Learning abstractions
Osiris works through the template library in order of increasing
complexity, using the machine learning tool TensorFlow to learn
parameter values [1]. We chose to use TensorFlow to facilitate
future extensions of our tool to more complex abstractions. Osiris
uses the SMT solver z3 in the bisection search procedure to nd
the minimal oset ϵ that produces a true overapproximation of the
lookup table function.
6.4 Proving specications
Once each abstraction Ai has been generated for each lookup table
Li (i = 1, . . . ,k), Osiris forms the following logical formula.
A1 (x ) ∧ · · · ∧Ak (x ) ∧ Σ(x ) ∧ ¬S (x )
en, Osiris invokes the SMT solver z3 to check for satisability.
If the formula is not satisable, z3 has proven that there is no
value that satises the abstractions and the model constraints but
falsies the specication. Since the abstractions overapproximate
the lookup table functions, it follows that the system with the
lookup table functions satises its specications. If the formula
was satisable, Osiris proceeds to the falsication stage.
6.5 Falsication
If a violation of the safety property xˆ is found, this does not nec-
essarily mean that the original system violates its specications.
For each lookup table Li , Osiris nds nearest breakpoints in each
lookup table. en, Osiris tries to prove the correctness of the model
only between those breakpoints. If the verication fails, the result is
now a true counterexample, which can be reported to the designer.
If no true counterexample is found, Osiris tries to compute new
abstractions with the next set of templates in the template library.
7 CASE STUDY
Figure 5: Diagram of adaptive cruise control scenario
For our case study, we consider the verication benchmark pub-
lished by Toyota InfoTechnology Center at [16]. is benchmark
consists of an adaptive cruise controller along with an online moni-
tor. When enabled, adaptive cruise control regulates the speed of
the car so that a target speed is maintained, unless another car is
detected at some distance in front, in which case the system tries
to maintain a safe distance from the lead car, as shown in Figure
5. is controller takes as input the current speed of the car, the
distance to the lead car, and the relative speed between the two
cars.
e system consists of a cascade of three lookup tables, as shown
in Figure 6. e inputs to the controller are s , the speed of the
controlled car, ∆x , the distance to the leading car, and ∆v the
relative speed of the two cars.
Figure 6: Signal-ow model of an ACC controller
Osiris SCAV’17, April 2017, Pisburgh, Pennsylvania USA
e rst lookup table uses the current speed s of the controlled
car to determine a target set distance (∆(tarдet )x ) from the leading
car. If the controlled car is moving fast, its braking distance will be
larger, which requires the controller to choose a larger following
distance. ∆(error )x is the dierence between the target following
distance and the chosen following distance, and the second lookup
table uses ∆(error )x together with the relative velocity ∆v to choose
an acceleration a. e third lookup table behaves as an online
monitor. In practice, a monitor lookup table would be produced by
recording observations of a physical component. For this example,
the monitor was generated by computing the future distance be-
tween the two cars aer 0.1 seconds, given the current distance,
relative velocity, and chosen acceleration. is monitor assumes
that the lead car will not change its velocity within the next 0.1
seconds.
e property we wish to prove is that the online monitor will
never predict a future distance that is negative, i.e., it will never
predict that the cars will crash. is does not mean that the closed-
loop system with the real automotive dynamics will not crash,
since that would require analyzing the continuous-time dierential
equations. However, industrial controllers are frequently equipped
with online monitors that predict or prevent dangerous conditions,
and checking that the controller satises its monitor is valuable, as
it prevents any abnormal behavior as long as system integrity is
preserved. However, Osiris is not limited to analyzing properties
based on a monitor, and can analyze general properties expressed
in rst-order logic over the variables of the model.
e rst lookup table is one-dimensional and contains 21 break-
points, resulting in 22 possible interval values. e second lookup
table is two-dimensional, and has a total of 1,232 possible interval
values. e third lookup table is three-dimensional and has 2,856
possible values. A brute-force aempt at proving correctness would
need to consider all possible combinations of lookup table values.
Considering all possible cominations of internal values leads to a
total of 77,409,024 proof cases.
We translated our model to rst order logic to use an SMT solver
to check validity of the specication. We do not explicitly include
the logical formulas that represent the lookup table due to space
constraints, but they can be easily constructed by multilinear inter-
polation on the public benchmark les. e translated rst order
logic constraints are:
0 ≤ ∆x ≤ 180,
− 50 ≤ ∆v ≤ 50,
0 ≤ s ≤ 180,
∆
(tarдet )
x = LUT1 (s ),
∆
(error )
x = ∆x − ∆(tarдet )x ,
a = LUT2 (∆
(error )
x ,∆v ),
∆
(next )
x = LUT3 (∆x ,∆v ,a).
e constraints on ∆x , ∆v , and s are assumptions on the bounds
of these inputs, and the system cannot be enabled if these bounds
are not met. Similarly, commercial adaptive cruise control systems
cannot be used if the speed of the controlled car is too slow.
Figure 7: Plot of LUT 1 data and abstractions
We tried to verify the model directly by translating it into rst-
order logic constraints and using z3 to check for a violation of the
specication, but z3 did not terminate aer 48 hours.
When we ran this model in Osiris, a counterexample was found
in 1 minute and 50 seconds, as follows:
s 7→ 31.0,
a 7→ −2.0,
∆v 7→ −4.0,
∆x 7→ 0.03125,
∆
(error )
x 7→ −30.97,
∆
(tarдet )
x 7→ 31.0,
∆
(next )
x 7→ −0.00865.
e meaning of this counterexample is that the cars start at a
distance ∆x of about 3 cm, with a relative velocity of −4m/s , i.e. the
controlled car is moving 4m/s faster than the lead car. e controller
brakes by applying a negative acceleration of a = −2m/s2, but the
situation is already too dangerous and the cars have a minor crash,
with the controlled car being 0.8cm further than it should be.
To measure the runtime of our verication technique, we relaxed
the specication to ∆(next )x ≥ −2. With this relaxed property, the
monitor no longer tries to completely prevent collisions, but simply
to reduce their severity. Of course, this is not a controller that
could be deployed for a commercial automotive system, it is simply
for benchmarking of our tool. is relaxed property was provable
in 30 seconds, which compares favorably with an analysis time
of approximately four hours in [11] on a machine with the same
specications. e case study computations were carried out on a
machine with 44 cores, with available hyperthreading to 88 threads
and 256 GB of RAM.
Computed abstractions. e abstraction computed for LUT1 con-
sists of a linear function, shied above and below the lookup table
SCAV’17, April 2017, Pisburgh, Pennsylvania USA Nikos Are´chiga et al.
data.
A1 = [1.31s − 4.0315 − ϵ1,1.31s − 4.0315 + ϵ1]
We have deliberately le the constants un-simplied. e constant
ϵ1 = 34.1797 is useful because it represents the largest error be-
tween the abstraction and the lookup table itself. us, we can
compare which lookup tables are being abstracted with more or
less delity by looking at the value of ϵ .
e abstraction computed for LUT2 is a linear function, and has
the form
A2 = [f2 − ϵ2, f2 + ϵ2]
where
f2 = 0.023843553∆(error )x + 0.091889∆v − 0.51779
with ϵ2 = 3.90625.
e abstraction computed for LUT3 is a linear function.
A3 = [f3 − ϵ3, f3 + ϵ3]
where
f3 = 0.99876517∆x + 0.00795821∆v − 0.0016369a
and ϵ3 = 0.5859375.
8 CONCLUSION
We have developed a tool to automatically compute abstractions of
lookup tables. We treat the lookup table breakpoints as training data
for a regression procedure, and learn an abstraction of the lookup
table. Abstracting the lookup tables allows for fast, automatic
verication of input-output properties of large-scale controllers
with lookup tables.
Osiris parses a set of logical constraints along with lookup tables
represented as Matlab programs, as well as regression templates
from an extensible library, which is sorted by complexity. Starting
at the lowest level of complexity, Osiris aempts to generate ab-
stractions to prove the desired specication, increasing the level of
complexity aer each failed aempt. e extensible nature of our
template library makes it easy for engineers in dierent application
domains to add templates that may provide a good t to the lookup
tables that appear in their discipline.
We have demonstrated the eectiveness of our approach on a
public benchmark, which consists of an adaptive cruise controller
with lookup tables. e best published analysis time for this model
is around four hours [11], and Osiris has completed the analysis in
thirty seconds on a machine with the same specications.
9 FUTUREWORK
We have identied several directions for future work. We would
like to generalize the form of the abstractions that we use, since
our current abstractions are limited to upper and lower bounding
functions. Also, we would like to explore the possibility of using
a learning method with beer theoretical guarantees (e.g. SVMs),
since our current setup yields a non-convex optimization problem.
e current implementation of Osiris can only check single spec-
ications. In the case when the specication does not hold, one
can obtain insight by relaxing the specication. In future work, we
would like to support sets of specications, and to construct a laice
of relaxed specications, which Osiris would iteratively aempt to
prove. In this way, we would be able to provide the designer with a
trade-o curve of which of the desired specications are easier or
more dicult to prove. We also plan to extend our template library
as we gain experience with further case studies.
Osiris currently only supports static SMT tools as back-end
solvers. In future work, we would like to extend the applicability of
our technique to handle closed-loop control systems, which would
require a hybrid model checking tool, or some kind of automatic
invariant guessing heuristic.
Additionally, we would like to provide beer feedback to the
designer about which parts of the design seem to be most critical
to satisfying the specications. is would require an ecient way
to quantify the expected improvement in the specication with
respect to the improvement of each abstraction.
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